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Empirical approaches to norms and normativity have been emerging for 
the last two decades both in the Social Sciences and Philosophy. However, the 
definition of norms and their classification are complex and controversial 
topics. For example, conventionalistic views generally defended by rationality 
theorists usually suppose that agent's behaviours create and spread norms;  
philosophers of law opt instead for some kind of prescriptivism assuming that 
the establishment of a norm involves some kind of external authority. This is 
the sort of dilemma explored in Explaining Norms, by Geoffrey Brennan, Lina 
Eriksson, Robert Goodin and Nicholas Southwood, professors at the 
Australian National University. 
The underlying problem discussed by the authors is the social or agential 
nature of norms. Roughly speaking, while the former assumes that agents just 
incorporate existing previous norms into their lives, the latter defends that 
norms are ultimately created by agents. Advocates of the social approach 
generally take a holistic and non-reductive stance: norms are adopted by whole 
groups due in their own normative terms. Those who opt for the agential view 
are usually individualistic and reductionists about norms: they are adopted if 
the members of the group individually adhere to their non-normative truth. 
The solution proposed in Explaining Norms is a third way: an individualistic 
but non-reductive view of norms (pp. 4-5). 
In the introduction (chapter 1), the authors give some general but basic 
ideas and concepts about norms. Norms are constituted by normative and 
socio-empirical elements. Normative elements partly consist of normative 
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principles or rules that depend on general requirements, that establish what 
agents must or must not do. Socio-empirical elements point to the 
determinants of acceptance in the group or community. This chapter presents 
the topics addressed in the rest of the book: types of norms (formal and non-
formal norms, and within the latter, social and moral norms), the explanatory 
options (individual agency, empirical structure or social ideas), and a rational 
choice analysis of norms. Finally, the authors state their goals as follows: «Our 
aim is to bridge the gap between rational-choice theories and rival theories by 
taking a broad view of what matters to people (…) Our aim in this book is to 
salvage quite a bit of rational-choice approach by combining it with 
constructivist approaches, as is we think eminently appropriate» (p. 9).  
In Part I (chapters 2, 3, 4) norms are defined in terms of accountability: 
«Our hypotheses is that norms serve the function of making us accountable; 
and that the different kinds of norms can be understood in terms of the 
different kinds of accountability that they create» (pp. 10-14). Chapter 2 shows 
some counterexamples to the characterizations of norms as practices and as 
desires, against Bicchieri's analysis based on beliefs and desires (2006). Then 
the authors present Hart's (1961) account of norms based on a significant 
proportion of members of a group having a normative attitude and knowing 
that other significant proportion of members of the same group have the same 
normative attitude. Chapter 3, based on Hart's (1961) concepts of primary and 
secondary rules, explains the demarcation between formal and non-formal 
norms in terms of the existence of external mechanisms, de re or de dicto 
normative attitudes and accountability mediation. It faces the debate between 
conventional and prescriptive analysis of norms. Chapter 4 lays out the 
demarcation between social and moral norms (both non-formal norms) stating 
that social norms are practice-dependent (what is called the Grounds View) 
while moral norms are not. The authors criticize the Forms and the Contents 
criteria and it ends analyzing the functions of these kinds of norms. 
Part II (chapters 5, 6, 7, 8) explores how norms emerge, persist and change. 
Particularly, chapter 5 discusses patterns of norm emergence: the two-step 
process (from less formal to more formal rules), free-flowing cascades, follow-
the-leader processes and norm adoption from convention. It also analyses the 
sources of normative persistence depending on costs, interests and 
expectations; the way norms change, and how they may unravel. Chapter 6 
deepens in the rational reconstruction view of norms, in which they depend on 
purposive and interested agents. The authors contend that this is a good way 
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of explaining why norms emerge and how we classify them, but it makes 
difficult to explain how these norms emerge, so that we cannot rationally 
reconstruct the origins of particular norms (unless we turn to historical 
explanations). The authors question about purposive analysis and scoping their 
boundaries and the state that for explaining norms we need to take care both 
of purposes that show why norms emerge and mechanisms that explain how 
they emerge. Chapter 7 is about the social meaning of norms and their use as 
signals and symbols to conform social roles and identities. The authors use 
March and Olsen's (1989) concept of 'logic of appropriateness' and they 
explore how far these social-role or identities accounts of norms explain norm 
emergence and diffusion. Unlike rational reconstructions, they conclude that 
these approaches are useful for explaining how norms emerge but not why. 
Chapter 8 focuses on bad norms: how they emerge, persist, how selection 
pressure acts with them and finally why they exhibit path dependency 
phenomena.  
Part III (chapters 9, 10, 11, 12) addresses the explanation of individual and 
group behaviours according to norms.  Chapter 9 explains norm following in 
terms of norm internalization, so that once agents follow a norm, they act 
accordinlyg to that norm because of that norm. Norm internalization assumes 
that the agent follows the norm and that he believes that it is generally 
accepted by the group. Conative states (desires, preferences) make sense of 
norm following better that cognitive attitudes (believes, perceptions) and 
internalization supposes that it is not necessary to have an instrumental reason 
for action. Social norms seem to be the paradigmatic type of norm followed. 
Chapter 10 explains norm compliance in terms of norm externalization, such 
that the agent acts in accordance with the norm not due to the norm, but 
because of other reasons like benefits and sanctions. In this case, formal norms 
are usually conformed. Chapter 11 analyses different sorts of such behaviour 
(ignoring a norm, calculated breach, pretending to comply-disguising non-
compliance, avoiding a norm). The authors study the possible causes and 
consequences of breaching a norm (from common non-compliers to 
conscientious objectors, from being punished to having a great benefit). 
Chapter 12, unlike the previous ones, do not focus on the relation between 
norms and actions, but on the relation between norms and attitudes-
deliberations: «norms also play an important role in explaining what goes on 
inside our heads» (p. 245). The authors also introduce processes of automatic 
choice of attitudes.  
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So far, Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin and Soutwood have developed an 
extensive characterization and classification of norms using some criteria based 
on a very suggestive individualistic but non-reductive account of norms.  
It seems to be a tension when thinking about moral norms. Norms have a 
normative element and a socio-empirical element: «What makes a normative 
principle a norm of a particular group of community is that it is somehow 
accepted in that group or community» (p. 3). On the other hand, «moral norms 
are clusters of essentially practice-independent normative judgements» (p. 72) 
with a derivative justificatory role in agent's mind.   
Norms suppose both a normative and a socio-empirical element. The 
normative element involves normative principles and these are general 
requirements that describe what the agent must or must not do. The socio-
empirical element states that «a normative principle is always a norm in or of a 
particular group or community» (p. 3). The authors reinforce this definition 
suggesting a Hartian account of norms in which a normative principle is a 
norm when «a significant proportion of the members» of a group have 
corresponding normative attitudes and «a significant proportion of the 
members [of a group] know that a significant proportion of the members [of 
this group]» have corresponding normative attitudes (p. 29).  
Moral norms are initially said to be related to accepted rules (p. 57), but 
they are defined in terms of their practice-independent nature «in the sense that 
presumed social practices may constitute no part of their grounds» (p. 59). In 
other words, moral norms are wholly individualistic accounted but socially 
accepted. Thus,  
[W]here an individual judges that soldiers must not rape women in war, if this is a 
genuine moral judgement, it may not be the case that in that individual's mind, a 
social practice of not raping women in war constitutes any non-derivative aspect 
of the justification for the requirement that soldiers not rape women in war. In 
this sense moral judgement are essentially practice-independent. Moral norms are 
clusters of essentially practice-independent judgements. Social norms are clusters 
of social judgements, which are necessarily practice-dependent in the sense that 
they are necessarily grounded, at least in part, in presumed social practices (p. 72) 
We have a problem when we face facts that are socially disapproved but 
individualistic accounted (e.g. think of a society in which smoking cannabis is 
disapproved and an agent's feeling is to accept it). The authors may say that in 
these cases we have normative attitudes followed by few agents but not moral 
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norms. The problem becomes larger when we analyse the patterns of 
emergence, diffusion and change of norms, as well as norm breaching: Norms 
usually start and spread from few people (maybe just one person) or external 
agents (formal norms), many times without the general acceptance implied by 
the socio-empirical element required in the definition of Norm. We may say 
that we initially have a normative attitude and latter a Norm, but in that case, 
our definition of Norm cannot be fully non-reductive as far as it ultimately 
depends on individual attitudes (e.g. initial general disapproval of cannabis 
consumption [Norm 1], existence of some consumers [Individual Attitude2] 
and subsequent social acceptance and legalization [Norm 2 based on Individual 
Attitude2]). A socio-empirical element seems to be necessary for a non-
reductive account of norms, but it is too demanding for moral norms.   
 It must be said that this account of norms may be very useful to face 
and analyse many prevalent issues. To name a few, these are the cases of 
political and social relations (relations between states, groups-communities and 
agents), cultural challenges (multiculturalism), economic management systems 
(kinds of ownership) or new technologies and social networks.  
 A final note on the structure of the volume: as the reader may have 
guessed, the content is presented in a modular manner that takes it particularly 
accessible for uninitiated readers. The writing is clear and this makes it a very 
suitable text for graduate teaching.  
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